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BOOK REVIEWS
Ethics (Systematic Theology, Volume I), by James Wm. McClendon, Jr.
Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986. pp. 384.

ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, University of California, Los Angeles.
McClendon has written an important book. It is also the beginning of an even
larger project, a systematic theology "in the light of the baptist vision" (p. 7).
By "baptist" McClendon means a Christian tradition originating in "the Radical
Reformation," including churches known as Anabaptist, Mennonite, Baptist,
Disciples of Christ, Churches of Christ, Brethren, and others (p. 34f.). The
enterprise receives added urgency from his (plausible) belief that the distinctive
voice of this tradition has not been heard in systematic theology nearly as much
as it deserves. The vision articulated, of course, is McClendon's own conception
of the distinctive baptist insight into Christian truth; he acknowledges that on
some points many (or even most) baptists today disagree with him.
The contemporary flavor of the work adds much, in my opinion, to its interest.
This is not a book that anyone would have written as much as twenty years ago.
The classics of "neo-orthodox" theology (especially the brothers Niebuhr) are still
major discussion partners, standing in a largely polemical relation to McClendon's
baptist vision. But he draws on more recent work in theology (especially Hans
Frei) and philosophy (Alasdair MacIntyre), to make the idea of narrative the
leading structural and interpretive theme of his theology (and of his ethics). This
theme is the focus of much of the most interesting work being done now in
theology, and McClendon is among its most illuminating interpreters.
He thinks the idea of narrative is particularly important for the baptist vision.
"[T]he vision can be expressed as a hermeneutical motto [a principle for interpreting Scripture], which is shared awareness of the present Christian community
as the primitive community and the eschatological community" (p. 31). And this
is "a narrative identification," an identification of one's own story with the story
both of Jesus and of his first disciples (p. 257).
The three volumes of McClendon's Systematic Theology are "to appear in the
order I, Ethics; II, Doctrine; III, Fundamental or Philosophical Questions" (p. 7).
This is the reverse of the usual order. He argues for beginning with ethics on
the ground that an understanding of Christianity begins with conversion "to a
new way of life," with "finding the shape of the common life in the body of
Christ" (p. 44f.). Doubtless he is also motivated at this point by the centrality
of the idea of discipleship, or following Jesus, in his baptist vision. The proof of
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the pudding, it seems to me, must be in the eating, which will not be fully
available until all three volumes are complete. I will note below some points at
which McClendon's ethics seems to depend on matters that we may hope will
be explained in the later volumes; but it may be that their dependence on the
first volume will be even more impressive.
McClendon discerns three "strands" in Christian ethics which give structure
to his account of it. He calls them (1) the "organic," (2) the "communal," and
(3) the "anastatic"-or "body ethics," "social ethics," and "resurrection ethics."
The first two of these have to do with ethics insofar as it relates, respectively,
to the nature (the whole nature, not just the uncontroversially bodily aspects) of
the human individual and to society. The third strand is the most original and
interesting feature of this classification. It pertains to the "morally revisionary
element" in the Christian story, rooted in divine interventions in history (p. 65),
of which the resurrection of Christ is the prime example; and it is an explicitly
eschatological strand. This anastatic stand is central to McClendon's baptist
vision; I think it also clearly represents an approach that has a claim on the
attention of any Christian moralist.
Like the strands of a rope (p. 64), these three work well only together, in
McClendon's opinion. For each strand, in addition to a general chapter about
it, the book contains a chapter on a more concrete ethical issue or topic related
to it [(1) sexual love, (2) discipline and forgiveness in the gathered church, (3)
war and peace], and between each of these pairs a narrative chapter, embodying
his commitment to story and showing the featured strand at work in a representative Christian life [(1) Sarah and Jonathan Edwards, (2) Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
(3) Dorothy Day]. A philosopher's may not be the most relevant response to
this use of narrative, but I will record that the chapters on the Edwards and on
Bonhoeffer seem to me really to advance the argument of the book-the chapter
on Day less so. Introductory chapters on the nature of theology and of ethics,
and a concluding chapter on the narrative approach to ethics, complete the volume.
I have selected three topics in McClendon's ethics for critical examination in
the space that remains here: (I) narrative, (II) interpretation, and (III) eschatology.
(I) McClendon contrasts "narrative ethics" with an "ethics of propositional principles." This may arouse some puzzlement, since it seems that narratives normally
are composed of propositions. Our author puts the matter more clearly, I think,
when he says he is "defending narrative ethics against the reductive claim that
insofar as narrative ethics is ethics, it can without loss of content be reduced to
nonnarrative propositions that express moral principles" (p. 346, my emphasis).
He also makes clear that in his view, "ethics itself is not a story and does not
tell a story; rather it investigates, analyzes, criticizes a way of life, amorality,
that is itself story-formed" (p. 332).
This sort of ethical examination of "story-formed" ways of life is used to great
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advantage in McClendon's discussion of the ethics of sexual love. Here he
focuses on the question, what story should control our thinking about love. He
begins with Denis de Rougemont's well known thesis "that our Western understanding of love is dominated by a mythic narrative of romance, which interprets
love as uncontrollable magic, infinite yearning, the road to tragic death" (p.
143). He goes on to the story of eros that he finds in Freudian theory, and to
the Augustinian story (or stories) of concupiscence and charity, of ordered and
disordered love. He criticizes all of these narrative understandings of love, and
contrasts them with "the fundamental love story of Christian faith," the story of
God's love in Christ (pp. 147ff.). With a richness that it would be foolish to try
to duplicate here, he develops some of the potentialities of that story as a model
for erotic love. This approach commends itself, I think, in at least two respects.
(1) It seems to achieve his goal of dealing with sexual ethics in a distinctively
Christ-centered way, yet without ignoring or devaluing our natural erotic aspirations. And (2) he provides convincing examples to show that 'What story of
love are we enacting?' is at least as useful a question to ask in seeking moral
light on the erotic area of life as 'What rules of conduct are we following?' or
'What virtues and vices are we embodying?'
Nonetheless there is at least one crucial question about the relation between
narrative and nonnarrative propositions on which the present volume does not
satisfy me. I am struck by the fact that McClendon seems to be a particularly
uncompromising advocate of certain nonnarrative propositions that express moral
principles-most clearly and emphatically, that Christians must not engage in
warfare or any other form of homicidal violence (ch. 11). He seems to endorse
these as exceptionless "moral absolutes"-though he does not use that terminology and does adopt an attitude that is at most gently reproachful toward
some of those fellow Christians who disagree with him on these points (such as
Bonhoeffer in his last, conspiratorial years). What I want to know is whether
McClendon thinks such an exceptionless precept can be derived from reasoning
about narratives; and if so, how.
The obvious place to look for an answer to these questions is the chapter (11),
largely devoted to interpretation of the stories of Jesus, of Israel, and of Christianity, in which he defends pacifism. And I think I see how he finds a conformity
between the primitive Christian story and pacifist stories for Christians today.
But there are always alternative ways of finding reverberations of one story in
another. McClendon recognizes this; indeed he is "attracted to a 'narrative'
explanation of persistent but diverse Christian attitudes to war and peace." He
cites studies of "the mythology of American warfare" to show that war stories
of no particularly Christian origin have received "a Christian overlay" that "subvert[ s1 the Jesus story." He suggests that it would be possible in a similar way
"to discover the implicit narrative beneath each of [the chief Christian theological
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defenses of participation in war], comparing and contrasting them with the Jesus
story," though this task is too large to be contained within the limits of his
project (pp. 313-15).
I am skeptical of the possibility of refuting in this way such theological
alternatives as the just war theory or the limited acceptance of revolutionary
violence in some liberation theology. The latter in particular is quite explicitly
grounded in a reading of the story of Jesus. McClendon might come up with
detailed criticisms of the liberation theologians' exegesis; but he will hardly
show (or even wish to show) that love of neighbor, a preferential option for the
poor, and hope for liberation from oppression are not leading themes of the story
of Jesus. And if someone believes that those are indeed the most important
relevant themes of the story of Jesus, and that in some circumstances a Christian
might best live out those themes by participating in revolutionary violence (or
in a plot to assassinate Hitler), I do not see what principles about narratives
would demonstrate an error in those conclusions (or in McClendon's). Perhaps
McClendon does not expect narrative considerations to decide the issue. He also
supports the exceptionlessness of the prohibition of killing by an appeal to the
Sixth Commandment and the Sermon on the Mount that looks to me more like
(highly sophisticated and possibly justified) proof texting than narrative theology
(p. 311f.). But he seems to doubt that that will settle the dispute either.
(II) We are involved here in issues about the interpretation of narratives.
McClendon notes it as "a profound difficulty in the ethics of principles and of
values . . . that their advocates have never been able to agree among themselves
upon which principles, or which values, are the right ones" (p. 334). Will it not
be at least as difficult to obtain agreement on the interpretation of narratives? A
case in point is the story of Bonhoeffer. McClendon (ch. 7) reads it as a tragedythe tragedy of a commitment to radical discipleship that could not be carried
through to the end because the needed context of a correspondingly committed
and disciplined (broadly baptist?) community was not present in Bonhoeffer's
Confessing Church. That is a possible interpretation. Others, however, have read
the story as one of continued growth in Christian maturity; and that may have
been Bonhoeffer's own interpretation. Certainly his well known quasi-last words,
cited by McClendon (p. 208), "This is the end-for me, the beginning of life,"
do not suggest a dominant sense of tragedy. All of these understandings of the
story, as I am sure McClendon would agree, are shaped by theological convictions
that did not originate with this story.
But of course it is the interpretation ofthe story of Jesus (and his first disciples),
and of our own stories in the light of it, that is most important for McClendon's
project. On what principles is that interpretation to be based? In a narrative
theology one might hope to find a hermeneutical key in a narrative link between
Jesus' story and our own-a link running through the story of centuries of
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Christianity and emphasizing the continuity of tradition. That may be in keeping
with MacIntyre's conception of the role of narrative in ethics, but it seems too
Catholic for McClendon's baptist vision. In perhaps the most important statement
in this volume about the baptist approach to interpreting Biblical narrative, he
contrasts his own
sense of "church now is the apostolic church" with a possible Catholic
sense of those very same words. The latter requires some notion of
succession and therefore of legitimate development. But successionism
is close to heresy in baptist eyes though embraced by a few, and development conveys a claim to inevitable progress more at home in nineteenth
century liberalism than in the thought world of the New Testament. The
baptist "is" in "this is that" is therefore neither developmental nor successionist, but mystical and immediate; it might be better understood
by the artist and poet than the metaphysician and dogmatist (p. 33).
The primary basis of baptist hermeneutics, then, will not be found in a narrative
link but in a more "immediate" relation of our story to the New Testament story.
Not that McClendon would entirely abandon tradition. Rather "he rejects the
dominant developmental view of church history and tradition which holds that
whatever 'the whole church' (really, European Christianity) has by now adopted
must have been God's own plan. "1 At times one might suspect that his interpretations are affected by a reading of Christian history that includes a baptist canon
of good guys and bad guys. He counts it against a theological argument that it
"leans heavily on the Constantinian era and region of church history" (p. 51),
and seems to approve "depending strongly on the baptist vision of certain sixteenth
century Reformers as well as on biblical insights" (p. 75). But the suspicion is
misleading. He does not want to be committed to "literal eras of 'fall' and datable
periods of 'restitution'-the present church, like the New Testament community
of disciples, is often errant or fallen, often restored" (p. 32). McClendon's ethical
writing draws copiously on the story of the church; and so far as I can see there
is no simple formula to characterize the role he thinks it should play in Biblical
interpretation.
One thing that is clear about the immediacy McClendon envisages between
our stories and Christ's story is that he sees it as inseparable from an ethics of
identification-identification both with Jesus (p. 257) and with his first disciples
(pp. 3 Iff.) . This identification seems at times to shade into imitation either of
Jesus or of the primitive church; but I think identification is the primary concept
for McClendon here. The honorable but very diverse history of imitation of
Christ has made clear that imitation is compatible with a great variety of interpretations; I doubt that identification will narrow the field of hermeneutical possibilities much more.
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I have not found in the present volume very clear principles to govern the
interpretation of the crucial stories. Maybe McClendon would say that the search
is misguided, reminding me of his hint that the immediate relation between our
stories and the New Testament story "might be better understood by the artist
and poet than the metaphysician and dogmatist." But perhaps a full discussion
of this issue is reserved for the third volume, on Fundamental or Philosophical
Questions; if so, I wonder whether this is not a point at which the ethics may
suffer from preceding the more methodological material.
(III) The issue of interpretation of the story of the church is closely linked in
McClendon's work with that of eschatology. In the course of his defense of
Christian pacifism, crossing swords with Reinhold Niebuhr's "Christian realism,"
McClendon accuses Niebuhr of offering us no eschatology. Niebuhr's vision of
sin and grace in human history, he says, "form[s] a seamless whole without
recourse to any future consummation" (p. 320). This is not entirely fair, in my
opinion, but not entirely unjust either, in view of Niebuhr's studied vagueness
about how the object of Christian hope transcends human history.
Ironically, however, the idea of a future consummation does not playa very
fully articulated role in McClendon's own ethics (so far as I can see). The main
point of disagreement between him and Niebuhr is in the area of realized eschatology. McClendon's pacifism is rooted in his conviction that Christians as such
are called to live the life of the Kingdom of God in the midst of this present
age, and that the extent to which the Kingdom has already come is sufficient
for that attempt to make sense. Accordingly he criticizes "Niebuhr's rejection
of the efficacy of the Holy Spirit to make Christians Christ-like, his downplay
of the new birth as a real transformation of human life," and "an overemphasis
[on sin] that makes of Niebuhr's ethic a strategy for (discriminately) sinful living
in an (indiscriminately) sinful world, rather than a strategy for transformed life
in a world become new in Christ Jesus" (p. 320). "Niebuhr," he charges, "is
too grimly 'realistic' in his assessment of the revolutionary possibilities of Christian community; his realism overlooks the new life in Christ" (p. 161).
I agree with McClendon that Niebuhr seriously underrated the possibilities of
a real transformation of human life, here and now, by the power of the Holy
Spirit. But I am sufficiently impressed by Niebuhr's richly perceptive reading
of human (and particularly Christian) history to wonder whether McClendon's
view of "the revolutionary possibilities of Christian community" may not go too
far in the opposite direction. It is one of the lessons of Christian history, as
Niebuhr saw it (and as I see it), that the Christian commitment of even the best
of Christian communities is itself a standing temptation to spiritual pride, and
that all such communities fall from time to time into very harmful sins and
errors. This makes it very dubious whether the contrast between church and
world can bear the moral weight that McClendon wishes to lay upon it (e.g.,
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pp. 17f., 234). Any community of the frankly "sectarian" (p. 214) type that he
advocates, if it endures for long, will (rightly, I think) be found oppressive by
a number of its members.
McClendon is keenly aware of such dangers. He looks to practices of truthfulness, mutual criticism, and above all forgiveness to prevent the "soured communitarianism" that "litter[s] the pages of every honest church history" (p. 229).
This may underestimate the elusiveness of grace, however. Experience supports
Niebuhrians in thinking there is no "technique" by which "an entire community,
even of committed disciples, [could] be kept on the track," as McClendon seems
to hint may be claimed for the practices of "never-ending congregational conversation" and forgiveness (p. 223).
It is not entirely clear to me how far McClendon disagrees with Niebuhr on
these matters, or how he would respond to Niebuhrian criticisms. Fortunately
we may look for his second, doctrinal volume to shed more light on his eschatology, and consequently on his ethics.
NOTES
1. P. 75. He says this about John Howard Yoder, but with clear approval.

Process Theology, edited by Ronald Nash. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, A Mott Media Book, 1987. Pp. xii and 387.

WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS, Washington and Lee University.
According to editor Nash, process theology is currently "the chief competitor"
to traditional Christian theism. Viewed by its adherents as "an intellectually and
emotionally satisfying reinterpretation of Christianity that is compatible with
late-twentieth century ways of thinking" and by its critics as "the most dangerous
heresy presently threatening the Christian faith ... a total capitulation to
paganism," process theology (PT) has grown so influential that, in the view of
Professor Nash, it can no longer be ignored by "traditional theists." "A comprehensive critical assessment of process theology therefore is long overdue.
This book is an attempt to redress this situation" (p. x).
It fails, on many counts.
It is, to be sure, critical. Save for Norris Clarke's irenic ("door-opening")
essay seeking dialogue between PT and neo-Thomism, all of the essays are
critical, often harshly critical, of some facets, often of many facets, of PT. The
tone of voice varies from calm philosophical analysis and argument to shrill
accusation of heresy and sinfulness, and the quality of thought varies even more.
Several authors (Craig, Clark, Morris and Pinnock) do manage to find some

